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Abstract 
Employees’ non-compliance with information systems (IS) security policies is a key concern for 
organizations. Previous studies have proposed different explanations for employees’ behavior, such 
as the use of sanctions and monitoring, fear appeal and training, which represent different paradigms 
of learning. Previous works do not test the validity of their models or methods across different 
cultural settings. Based on interviews in four countries, we argue that while information security 
behaviors are learned, different paradigms of learning are effective in different cultures; i.e., different 
cultures require different IS security interventions. What is even more important is that by providing 
non-preferred IS security interventions (e.g., monitoring/sanctions in Switzerland) were negative for 
improving information security.   
This study has implications for IS security research, editors, and practitioners. For scholars, we urge 
them to not only validate, but also test their models in different countries.  The implication for editors 
is the need to re-consider their reviewing policy and accept papers that also show the limits of their 
model (not positive results) in some countries. From a managerial perspective, our findings suggest 
that different cultures require different IS security interventions. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The increased processing of sensitive information in organizations has brought information security 
issues to the forefront. One widely reported information systems (IS) security issue is employee non-
compliance with IS security procedures (Johnston & Warkentin 2010). To help organizations address 
this concern, scholars have introduced different factors or variance models aimed at explaining or 
predicting employee compliance with IS security procedures (Bulgurcy et al. 2010; Herath & Rao 
2009a; Johnston & Warkentin 2010; Siponen & Vance 2010). In addition, scholars have examined the 
means by which employees’ intentions and behaviors can be changed (Johnston & Warkentin 2010; 
Puhakainen & Siponen 2010). While these studies have increased our understanding of employee 
compliance and how it can be improved, they do not test the validity of their models or methods 
across different cultural settings. In other areas of IS, cultural differences are common. To give one 
example in the IS security context in terms of power distance (Hofstede 1991)—how people 
accept/expect a hierarchical order in a society—it could be argued that in the high-power distance 
cultures, employees prefer behavioristic teacher-centered training where teachers are expected to take 
all initiatives in class, and students are comfortable with obeying the behavioral rules and norms 
expressed by the teacher. In turn, in the low-power distance cultures, employees could prefer student-
centered approaches characterized by reciprocal communication and shared expertise between the 
“teacher” and employees (Karjalainen & Siponen 2011). Since organizations are becoming 
increasingly global and multicultural, there is a need to ensure the proposed means are effective in 
different cultural settings. Given that previous research has not examined this idea, this study 
contributes to the current IS research and practice by explaining how different approaches are 
effective in different cultures for changing employees’ IS security behavior.  
Our results are relevant to scholars and practitioners alike. For scholars, our results highlight the need 
to understand as well as further research the role of culture in employee compliance with IS security 
procedures. For practitioners, our results show that different cultures need different methods for 
changing employee IS security behavior, and point out practices that are expected to work in different 
countries. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The second section discusses the concept of culture and 
learning paradigms that form the basis for the study, and points out the lack of previous work on the 
influence of employees’ cultures. The third section discusses the research methods, while the fourth 
section presents the results. The fifth section highlights the key findings and presents implications for 
future research and practice. 
2 PARADIGMS OF LEARNING AS THEORETICAL SENSITIVITY 
AND PREVIOUS WORK ON IS SECURITY BEHAVIOR 
This section introduces the concept of culture and discusses the paradigms of learning (Hung 2001; 
Miller & Seller 1985), and finally notes that previous works propose different means for influencing 
employees’ IS security behavior, which present different paradigms of learning.  Previous works do 
not discuss, however, whether their proposed means are effective in different cultural settings. 
2.1 Culture 
Two key questions in cultural research are the following: what is the underlying cultural theory and 
how does one define culture (Straub et al. 2002)? With respect to the former, much of the IS research 
on culture has applied Hofstede’s theory (Myers & Tan 2002; Walsham 2002). While we are not 
denying the value of Hofstede’s theory, previous research is rather critical of it (see Myers & Tan 
2002; Walsham 2002). One of the critiques is that a score on, say, the scale of masculinity or 
uncertainty avoidance in terms of Hofstede’s theory may be disconnected to specific context issues, 
such as employees’ compliance with IS security procedures (Walsham 2002). From a theory-
development perspective, besides knowing that individuals in a certain country tend to score high on 
masculinity, it would be equally important to know what is culturally specific in IS security behavior 
in different countries. Obviously, Hofstede’s theory cannot provide such context-specific knowledge. 
For this reason, we study employees’ IS security behavior in different cultures inductively, following 
the work of Walsham (2002). 
The definition of culture is a controversial issue. For example, Kroeber et al. (1952) present 164 
definitions of culture. In the IS literature, Leidner and Kayworth (2006) note that culture may be 
defined by cultural artifacts such as norms, practices (Delong & Fahey 2000; Hofstede 1998), 
symbols (Burchell et al. 1980), individual belief systems, individual or corporate values, and cultural 
artifacts (Schein 1985).  Straub et al. (2002) provide three categories of culture definitions.  
For our study, we adopt the definition of Walsham (2002, p. 362), who defines culture as “as shared 
symbols, norms, and values in a social collectivity such as country,” noting, however, that national 
cultures are composed of different people. As a result, Walsham (2002) maintains that there are 
individual differences within each cultural context. Another important point is that while culture is a 
group-level phenomenon, it manifests itself through the individuals, and hence culture can be assessed 
at an individual level (Straub et al. 2002). 
One common assumption among the different definitions of culture is the idea that cultural 
assumptions are learned and, hence, can be changed (Schein 1985; Straub et al. 2002; Walsham 
2002). This assumption has an important role in our study, and it is consistent with the paradigms of 
learning (Hung 2001; Miller & Seller 1985), which are illustrated in the next section and presented in 
Table 1. 
2.2 Paradigms of Learning 
 
Learning 
paradigm 
Behaviorism Cognitivism Constructivism and social 
constructivism 
Objective 
 
Reception and mastery 
of pre-defined contents 
as objective knowledge  
Development of 
cognitive abilities and 
problem-solving 
skills 
Transformation of 
predominant beliefs and 
actions; personal or communal 
change 
Teaching/learning 
methods 
-­‐ Instructor-led 
approaches in 
order to transmit 
knowledge -­‐ Imitation or 
observational 
learning  -­‐ Providing external 
reinforcement: 
punishments and 
rewards 
Focuses on cognitive 
problem solving and 
analysis 
Focuses on critical reflection 
of knowledge through 
collaboration or authentic 
problem solving  
Examples of each 
paradigm of 
learning  
-­‐ Reading or 
listening to formal 
presentations -­‐ IS security 
campaigning -­‐ Fear appeal 
campaign 
-­‐ Using real-world 
examples of 
relevant assets, 
threats, and IS 
security 
accidents -­‐ Asking questions -­‐ Using emotions 
in learning 
-­‐ Discussing employees’ 
experiences, attitudes, 
and behaviors towards IS 
security policies -­‐ Learning through 
experience and 
experienced IS security 
accidents -­‐ Active acquisition and 
personal interest towards 
IS security-related 
knowledge -­‐ Involvement of IS 
security issues 
Table 1. Paradigms of learning (e.g., Hung 2001; Miller & Seller 1985) 
2.2.1 Behaviorism 
The objective of behavioristic learning is to convey certain predefined contents, knowledge, facts, 
skills, concepts, and values to learners (Miller & Seller 1985). One-way communication through 
reading or listening without opportunities to reflect on the information is characteristic of behaviorism 
(Miller 2007). In the context of IS security training, using behavioristic teaching methods involves the 
teacher presenting IS security policies or information security threats and prevention activities to 
learners through different audiovisual means (e.g., face-to-face presentations and computer-based 
presentations). This is done without paying attention to the learning processes, problem-solving 
assignments (cognitivism), or individual or communal reflections on experiences (constructivism and 
social constructivism). Therefore, the content is presented to employees through reading or listening 
to formal presentations. 
The behavioristic learning paradigm assumes that people learn through role models, a model that is 
based on imitation or observational learning (e.g. Bandura 1977). Hence, changing behaviors by 
following the role model of management can be seen as a behavioristic method. 
The behavioristic learning paradigm also assumes that the learner’s responses can be shaped through 
instructional procedures, such as reinforcement (Palincsar 1998). This means the learner’s desired 
behavior is strengthened through monitoring behavior and offering positive reinforcement or 
punishments (Skinner 1969). Therefore, changing IS security beliefs through behavioristic methods 
involves changing behaviors through monitoring, punishments, and rewards.  
2.2.2 Cognitivism  
While behaviorism stresses the importance of the effective delivery of knowledge, imitation, and 
reinforcement in changing behaviors, cognitivism focuses on the mental activities of the learner and 
the efficient processing of knowledge (Hung 2001). Examples of cognitive learning methods include 
receiving reasons for compliance with IS security procedures, using real-world examples of relevant 
assets, threats, and IS security accidents, asking questions, and using emotions in learning. 
2.2.3 Constructivism and social constructivism 
The essential feature of constructivist and social constructivist learning is making connections 
between employees and the real world while making employees aware of their thinking processes. 
This idea maintains that learning occurs by critically reflecting on information through authentic 
problem solving and communication (Miller & Seller 1985). Learning requires interaction, 
negotiation, and collaboration (Palincsar 1998).  When a person or group critically reflects, they 
question the validity of their actions and thoughts in order to change their perspectives (Mezirow 
1991). To apply social constructivism to the context of IS security training, teaching methods should 
involve discussing employees’ experiences, attitudes, and behaviors towards IS security policies. 
Such discussions are the foundation of collaborative learning, and must be planned to achieve mutual 
understanding and agreements on how to implement security policies in daily work.  While 
behaviorist and cognitivist learning is directed by the external environment (e.g., organizational 
control, the trainer), constructivism stresses the active role of the learner in constructing new 
knowledge either individually or in collaboration with other people (Hung 2001). In the context of 
this research, (social) constructivist learning methods include problem-solving activities, learning by 
doing, reflecting on received knowledge, learning through experience, active acquisition, personal 
interest towards IS security-related knowledge, communication, discussion, and involvement. 
2.3 Previous research on employee compliance with IS security procedures and IS security 
training  
Based on the paradigms of learning introduced in the previous section, the extant empirical literature 
is divided into three research areas: (1) studies reflecting behavioristic learning, (2) studies reflecting 
cognitive learning, and (3) studies reflecting constructivist and social constructivist learning. All three 
of these research areas offer different perceptions of why employees comply with IS security 
procedures and how their behavior can be changed in an organizational context, and are based on 
empirical research and/or theories of learning. 
Typically, behavioristic training emphasizes the instructor’s activity or external reinforcement, 
leaving no room for active learning experiences (e.g., problem solving and critical reflection through 
communication). Studies reflecting on such behavioristic learning in the field of IS security behavior 
(1) report the influence of sanctions, rewards, or monitoring on employees’ IS security behavior 
(Beautement et al. 2009; Bulgurcy et al. 2010; D’Arcy et al. 2008; Herath & Rao 2009a; 2009b; Li et 
al. 2010; Myyry et al. 2009; Siponen et al. 2007; Stanton et al. 2005). However, some research reports 
an insignificant effect between monitoring, sanctions, and/or rewards, and IS security behavior 
(Herath & Rao 2009a, 2009b; D’Arcy & Hovav 2007; Li et al. 2010; Pahnila et al. 2007; Siponen & 
Vance 2010). In addition, Johnston and Warkentin (2010) present the influence of fear appeals on 
employees’ IS security behavior.  
Besides punishments, rewards, and monitoring, the behavioristic learning approaches also assume that 
people learn through role models, a theory that is based on imitation or observational learning (e.g. 
Bandura 1977). Following this idea, Johnston and Warkentin (2010) and Dinev et al. (2009) write that 
social conformity, in terms of perceptions of peers and managers’ expectations and attitudes, has an 
influence on employees’ behavioral intentions to use anti-spyware software. Similarly, with social 
conformity, management and/or co-workers’ attitudes and behavioral expectations or peer behavior 
(Chan et al. 2005, Herath & Rao 2009a, 2009b, Pahnila et al. 2007; Siponen et al. 2006) have been 
shown to have an influence on employees’ IS security behavior. 
Second, the studies reflecting cognitive learning in the field of IS security behavior (2) recognize the 
activation of learners’ cognitive processing of information. Studies under this research area explain 
employees’ IS security behavior through cognitive issues such as cognitive load (Beautement et al. 
2009), failure to recognize the characteristics of human memory, unattainable or conflicting task 
demands, and lack of motivation (Sasse et al. 2001), cognitive processing (i.e., recognizing, 
understanding, and evaluating persuasive arguments) (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010), and the 
connectedness of students’ knowledge structures (Greitzer et al. 2007). 
Finally, studies reflecting constructivist or social constructivist learning (3) are learner- or 
community-centered, which means that learners need to reflect on their own reasons for behaviors and 
attitudes for becoming more security-conscious. IS security studies in this area indicate that involving 
users through dialogue, participation, and collective reflection is a requisite for effective IS security 
training (Albrechten 2007; Albrechtsen & Hovden 2010). Similarly, Karjalainen and Siponen (2011) 
introduce experiential and collaborative approach for IS security training. The importance of 
employees’ involvement in their organization’s IS security issues is also recognized by Lee et al. 
(2004). 
While all the aforementioned studies have been carried out in a single country, Hovav and D’Arcy 
(2012) added culture to their extended deterrence theory. They examined whether the deterrent effect 
of IS security practices, such as IS security policies, training, and monitoring, is influenced by culture 
in the United States and South Korea in the context of employee misuse of email and access rights. 
However, they did not collect actual cultural data, but they used the original Hofstede scores as a 
moderator. While the Hovav and D’Arcy (2012) study examined the organizational context, Dinev et 
al. (2009) built a model of the home-user context, specifically anti-spyware technology. This model 
expanded the theory of planned behavior using an integrated model of user acceptance of e-commerce 
(Pavlou and Fygenson 2006), adding the cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede (1993; 2001). 
They also performed a cross-cultural comparison between South Korea and the United States. 
However, like Hovav and D’Arcy (2012), Dinev et al. (2009) did not collect data about the cultures, 
but simply used Hofstede’s dimensions (and with standard scores) as moderators. 
To conclude this literature review, while previous studies on employee IS security behavior and IS 
security training have pointed out the need to study the role of culture in information security 
behavior (Hovav & D’Arcy 2012; Dinev et al. 2009), none of these studies have examined the role of 
culture in employee compliance with IS security procedures across cultures in a specific, intensive 
manner (see Walsham 2002). 
3 RESEARCH METHODS 
3.1 Data collection 
Empirical data collection was carried out in multiple locations of a global company (Company 
Globalcomp, a pseudonym), which operates in the marine industry and the energy market. The 
selected interview locations were Finland, Switzerland, the UAE, and China. These four locations 
were selected as representative of different cultural settings with the assistance of the information 
security manager of the organization. 
Empirical data were collected through semi-structured qualitative interviews. To avoid a situation in 
which only certain groups of employees in an organization were interviewed, and to make sure the 
data represented the views of the whole organization (Myers & Newman 2007), the interviewees were 
selected from different organizational positions. Altogether, 80 face-to-face interviews were 
conducted between June and November of 2009. Of the 80 interviewees, 20 were Chinese (China), 15 
were Western-European (Switzerland), 25 were Eastern-Asian (UEA), and 20 were Finnish (Finland). 
Interviewees in China and Finland were exclusively local employees. The respondents in Switzerland 
were originally from Germany (7), Austria (1), and Switzerland (7). The interviewees in the UAE 
were originally from India (15), Pakistan (4), Philippines (5), and Iraq (1). Fourteen interviewees were 
excluded from the analysis because they were originally from other countries, or their nationality was 
unclear (altogether, there were 94 interviews). The average interview length was 47 minutes.  
When conducting interviews, it is important to note that the scholar’s theoretical perceptions and 
perspectives do not drive the interview (Stinger 1999; Myers & Newman 2007), Therefore, the 
interviews were conversational in nature and involved a great deal of active listening to and 
understanding of the interviewees’ construction of meaning rather than eliciting facts (Schulze & 
Avital 2011). Finally, it is important to ensure that interviewees feel that the information they reveal 
will not be used against them (Myers & Newman 2007). To address this issue, the interviewers 
carefully explained to the participants that the interview was confidential and that only the researchers 
were able to access the interview data. The interviewer also avoided presenting their own opinions on 
the research topic by emphasizing that there was no right or wrong response. Seventy-nine interviews 
were recorded and transcribed. Only one interviewee preferred the use of field notes. 
3.2 Data analysis 
Our research approach can be characterized as interpretative, qualitative, data-intensive, and 
inductive, with themes primarily derived from interviews (Walsham 2006).  
Based on the interviewer’s experiences during the interviews and the focus on our study, certain 
interview topics were selected for further examination. These topics were related to cultural 
differences in employee IS beliefs, how these behaviors are formed, and how they can be changed. 
The interview transcripts were analyzed by reading them as a whole and systematically searching a 
list of concepts related to management’s role and how people learn new IS security procedures. A 
constant comparative approach to data analysis was followed. Based on this analysis, which was 
conducted by two researchers, general trends showing the common and different features among the 
four cultures were identified. The results of the study are discussed in Section 4.  
4 RESULTS 
Our study presents culture-independent and culture-dependent reasons for employees’ IS security 
behavior (Table 2). 
 
Culture- 
independent 
reasons 
- Include previous work experience, work environment, professional identity, 
media, other people, social conformity, and active organizational IS security 
communications 
Culture-dependent 
reasons  
Behaviorism 
Typical learning 
paradigm for 
interviewees in China 
and the UAE: -­‐ Behaviorist 
learning methods 
were preferred: 
one-way delivery 
of knowledge -­‐ Employees’ IS 
security behavior 
is positively 
influenced by 
authority -­‐ People learn 
through imitation 
or observation of 
management’s 
actions  -­‐ Punishments, 
rewards, and 
monitoring were 
considered 
effective methods 
Cognitivism 
No clear cultural 
differences 
Constructivism and social 
constructivism 
Typical learning paradigm for 
interviewees in Finland and 
Switzerland: -­‐ Constructivist learning 
methods were preferred: 
active role of the learner 
in constructing 
knowledge either 
individually or in 
collaboration with other 
people -­‐ Emphasis of the personal 
responsibility of each 
individual employee 
instead of management’s 
support -­‐ Monitoring of employees 
was considered 
ineffective method and 
had a negative effect on 
behavior 
 
Table 2: Summary of the results of the study 
4.1 Culture-independent reasons explaining employees’ IS security behavior 
The interviews revealed several culture-independent reasons for employees’ IS security behavior. 
Specifically, employees’ IS security behavior – across cultures – is learned from their previous work 
experience, morals and upbringing, work environment, professional identity, media, and social 
conformity. In addition, changing employees’ IS security behavior is expected to require active 
organizational IS security communications in all countries. 
Work experience: Employees’ work experience may create false confidence concerning their IS 
security competence and, hence, preclude their interest in learning new IS security knowledge. In all 
four countries, employees with more work experience believed they followed secure working 
practices. The influence of work experience on an employee’s IS security behavior was seen 
exclusively as positive by the respondents. Consequently, employees did not recognize that previous 
experiences could also hinder learning new and better IS security practices. 
In addition, the interviews showed that employees had a tendency to consider all work experience 
equal from the viewpoint of one's IS security behavior. Typically, employees followed IS security 
procedures they had adopted during their previous jobs. The interviewees seemed to expect that 
different organizations have similar IS security, as the following observation from an employee from 
the UAE points out: 
“...I had some experience in a previous company and the company before that also. I have been 
working in this industry for the past nine or ten years, so of course I have enough [security 
compliance-related] skills." 
Morals and upbringing: The role of an employee’s moral characteristics plays a key role in explaining 
his compliance and non-compliance with an organization’s IS security policies. Hence, according to 
the respondents, a loyal, honest, and trustworthy person was assumed to comply with his or her 
employer's IS security policies and instructions. In contrast, non-compliance with the IS security 
procedure for personal benefit or harm to the employer was attributed to individual dishonesty, which 
was also linked to poor upbringing. Interestingly, some interviewees also linked non-compliance to 
the political climate in the workplace, where individuals may engender negative feelings about 
colleagues, and thereby fail to uphold the highest ethical standards.  
Work environment: The interviews showed that employees’ considerations regarding IS security 
threats in their working environment influence their IS security behavior. The interviewees expressed 
that IS security procedures, such as locking computers or selecting strong passwords, are pointless 
due to the strong physical and technical security in their working environment. As an example, 
employees expected that information security is taken care of by the IT department through technical 
safeguards, such as firewalls and malware protection. Consequently, the employees did not see 
personal effort as necessary. As another example, some of the interviewees trusted their colleagues. 
Thus, they believed that strict IS security instructions for the workplace were unnecessary, a 
perception illustrated by the following statement of a Chinese officer:  
“They don’t lock the PC; they lock the door so I think everything is safe… And also they trust others; 
they trust the system security…safeguard of company.” 
Professional identity: Employees’ IS security behavior seemed to be intricately related to employees’ 
professional identity; i.e., employees saw IS security as an integral part of their work responsibility. 
Professional identity was found to be associated with individual employees, as well as with working 
teams, business units, or even the entire company. For example, employees in human resources (HR) 
departments emphasized that IS security is an important aspect of their profession, as illustrated by a 
Swiss HR employee officer: 
“I think in Human Resources you deal with so much sensitive information that it’s clear that you have 
to be very careful of what you are telling to other people and so on. And if you, I don’t know, have 
another profession..… [this may not be the case].....  If you are a carpenter, then that is no issue at 
all.”  
Media: The visibility of information security in the media has an impact on employees’ IS security 
behavior. The influence of media on employees’ IS security behavior was mentioned especially by 
employees with a personal interest in computers and ICT. The respondents also brought up the 
possibility that increasing IS security requirements in employees’ personal lives (e.g., Internet 
banking, social media) may make employees more open to IS security requirements in their 
workplace. The close engagement of employees with media that were perceived to be susceptible to 
security concerns made the employees likely to comply with security policies, as described by a Swiss 
engineer:  
“Since I'm studying and surfing the Internet, reading a lot of stuff and some kind of computer addict, 
so I think you learn it by yourself, if, just if you think about that. And also, I think also when it started 
with Internet banking; you're really starting to be aware.” 
Social conformity: Employees’ IS security behavior was seen to be influenced by one’s assumptions 
about others’ IS security behavior. As an example, if an employee perceived that his or her co-
workers were using a particular IS security safeguard, the employee tended to conform to this 
behavior. Such social conformity makes employees consciously or unconsciously behave according to 
the common rules of their work community. In addition, actively communicated norms seemed to 
have a stronger effect on compliance. The influence of social conformity on employees’ IS security 
conventions is illustrated by a Swiss officer: 
“The people or the humans are not only individuals. They are living in a group. And if the majority of 
the group is doing certain things, then the others will follow.” 
Active communication: Active communication was seen as a key means in all countries for improving 
employees’ IS security behavior. In this case, communications cover the following: a) the company’s 
IS security policies, instructions, and other written information; b) IS security training; and c) active 
promotion of information security-related procedures by management. This was true across the 
different cultures studied. Some of these expectations were highlighted by a Swiss employee: 
“It [IS security] is everyone's task. First of all, it's highest [priority] at the management level… who 
first have to promote information security issues. And then they have to also provide information to 
employees about the importance of information security.” 
4.2 Culture-dependent reasons that explain employees’ IS security behavior  
Employees’ preferences regarding the means for learning IS security behavior vary across national 
cultures. The interviews revealed that employees in different countries prefer to learn IS security 
behavior by different means. In this study, employees’ learning (i.e., developing new or changing old) 
of IS security behavior is analyzed using the following four learning paradigms: behaviorism, 
cognitivism, constructivism, and social constructivism. The different roles of behavioristic learning 
principles in different countries (i.e., one-way delivery of information, authority, learning through 
imitation and observation, punishments, rewards, and monitoring) were especially highlighted by the 
results. 
Behaviorist learning methods: One-way delivery of information from management to employees was 
preferred in China. In the context of IS security, such behavioristic training implies that a teacher 
presents IS security issues by one-way communication from the trainer to the trainees, without 
necessarily customizing the training program to the trainees’ learning processes, problem-solving 
styles  (cognitivism), or individual or communal reflection of experiences (constructivism and social 
constructivism).  
Employees’ preference for behavioristic learning methods in China was highlighted by a Chinese 
employee as follows: 
“I think discussions are not the most efficient. I think, maybe for us, a presentation is enough.” 
Authority: Our interviews suggest that employees’ IS security behavior is influenced by authority, 
particularly in China and the UAE. For example, employees tend to comply with certain IS security 
policies and instructions if the employees are mandated to do so by a person in authority, such as their 
director or manager. Interestingly, some of the respondents felt free not to comply with the policies 
because authority figures had not explicitly signaled the importance of compliance, as described 
below by a Chinese manager: 
“I do not do it (lock the computer) here, because managers don’t ask me to do that…The manager 
should ask their subordinates to follow every type of company rule.”  
While employees of other countries expected management to play a more active role in promoting IS 
security, for Finnish employees, the active role of management in encouraging compliance with 
security policies had a smaller role in employees’ compliance. Instead, Finnish respondents 
emphasized the personal responsibility of each individual employee to protect valuable information.  
Imitation and observation: Another behavioristic learning method preferred in China, the UAE, and 
Switzerland—but not in Finland—was learning from the IS security behavior of management. The 
behavioristic learning paradigm assumes that people learn through imitation or observation. The 
interviews pointed out that employees in China, the UAE, and Switzerland perceived that the actions 
of management have a strong impact on their IS security behavior. A Chinese employee observed the 
following: 
“I think we trust them. And if they said, it's right, I think, yeah, it's right.” 
Similarly, a UAE-based employee argued,  
“Yeah, management’s role is also important… We understand our duties, everything. This is because 
of the management. Because management influences us all.” 
Punishments, rewards, and monitoring: Another behavioristic learning method for IS security 
behavior emphasized during the interviews was the use of punishments and rewards. Punishments and 
rewards were considered effective in China, the UAE, but not in Switzerland or in Finland. The 
efficient use of punishments and rewards requires constant monitoring of employees’ IS security 
behavior to allow instant rewarding and censuring. Most of the Asian employees in China and the 
UAE considered employer monitoring of employees an acceptable and effective method to impact 
employees’ IS security behavior. However, in Switzerland and Finland, the interviewees considered 
employer monitoring of employees not only inefficient, but also inappropriate. In addition, Swiss and 
Finnish employees considered monitoring to have a negative effect on employees’ IS security 
behavior, as it made employees feel that they were not trusted by their employer.  
Cognitivist learning methods: Instead of one-way delivery of knowledge, imitation, and reinforcement 
in learning, cognitivism focuses on the mental activities of the learner and efficient processing of 
knowledge. Examples of cognitivism include using real-world examples of relevant assets, threats, 
and IS security accidents, and asking questions during the IS security training. Cultural differences 
were not observed in the interviewees’ ideas about the benefits of such methods; principles of 
cognitive learning emerged across cultures. 
Constructivist and social constructivist learning methods: While behaviorism and cognitivism are 
mainly directed by the external environment (e.g., organizational control, trainer), constructivism 
stresses the active role of the learner in constructing new knowledge either individually or in 
collaboration with other people. In particular, the Swiss interviewees indicated their preference for 
(and effectiveness of) constructive and social constructive teaching and learning methods over 
behavioristic learning methods. This is well illustrated by a Swiss employee here: 
“Perhaps it (IS security) can also be discussed with the employees themselves. So that they are 
involved in the discussion. So that there's a better understanding… And so that they follow [IS 
security policies and instructions] better later on... … So that they feel that they are just involved and 
that they can bring in their opinion. It's always better if you are involved in the discussion and in the 
decision...“ 
5 DISCUSSION  
The key contribution of our study is the explanation of how different paradigms of learning are 
effective in the different cultures of Finland, Switzerland, the UAE, and China in changing 
employees’ IS security behavior. Next, we discuss the four contributions in more detail. 
First, the interviews revealed that employees in different countries prefer different means for learning 
IS security behaviors. These culture-dependent reasons explain employees’ IS security behavior and 
mean that different learning paradigms—behaviorism, constructivism, or social constructivism—seem 
to work in different countries. In particular, behavioristic learning methods are preferred in China. In 
Switzerland, constructive and social constructive learning methods are preferred. To our knowledge, 
this is a new finding in the IS security literature, and suggests that previous models and methods 
focused on changing employees’ IS security behavior may be limited to certain countries. 
Second, inappropriately influencing employees’ IS security behavior may have a negative effect on 
work motivation, such as lack of trust, an observation highlighted by Swiss and Finnish employees; 
Sanctions (Deterrence theory) is a case in point. In IS security literature, the role of sanctions in terms 
of deterrence theory has been strong (D’Arcy et al. 2008; Herath & Rao 2009a; 2009b; Li et al. 2010; 
Myyry et al. 2009; Siponen & Vance 2010). To our knowledge, this is a new finding in the IS security 
literature, and suggests new directions for future research. 
Third, besides culture-dependent reasons, we found a number of culture-independent reasons, 
meaning that information security behavior across cultures is learned through previous work 
experience, morals and upbringing, work environment, professional identity, media, and social 
conformity. In addition, in order to achieve a balance between employees’ IS security behavior and 
organizational policies, initiatives and communications are expected from management across 
cultures. This finding provides important insights about the issues that need to be emphasized in the 
IS security interventions across cultures. 
Fourth, our results suggest changing employees’ IS security behavior using multiple means. This 
means there is no single “silver bullet” for improving employees’ IS security behavior, but different 
means  ranging from a management role model to influence of authority, relevance of the threat to the 
critical assets, and visibility of information security. Employees’ IS security behavior is a complex 
phenomenon explained by various reasons, which is why different theoretical models find support in 
IS security research. They all have a role in explaining the complex phenomenon of employee 
compliance with IS security procedures. Given the complexity of the phenomenon, one interpretation 
of our results is that a reductionist method of finding a simple (parsimony) model with a few 
dependent variables may be difficult. Rather than using parsimony and generalizability as leading 
ideas behind the IS security research, future research should look for IS security context-specific 
theories, accuracy, and qualitatively rich descriptions (cf., Weick 1979). Example of these include IS 
security-specific theory development, in-depth qualitative research, and experiments that help to 
reveal the specific details of the phenomenon (accuracy). 
5.1 Implications for Practice and Research 
We would like to highlight the following implications for research and practice based on our findings.  
First, given that employees in different countries prefer to learn IS security behavior by different 
means, IS security interventions need to be customized for each country. Our findings imply that 
behaviorist learning methods, such as one-way training or campaigning without customizing the 
training program to the trainees’ learning processes, are effective in China. In turn, in Switzerland, 
constructive and social constructive teaching and learning methods should be used rather than 
behavioristic learning methods. In each country, employees’ misconception that they already know 
appropriate IS security behavior may lead them to overestimate their IS security skills and compliance 
with organizations’ IS security procedures. This creates a challenge to motivate experienced 
employees to acquire further skills on IS security.   
Second, punishments and rewards (as behavioristic learning methods) can be used in China and the 
UAE, but their use must be carefully considered in Switzerland and in Finland. In addition, 
monitoring should be carefully considered in Switzerland and in Finland. 
Third, in China, Switzerland, and the UAE, management must actively promote IS security. In 
Finland, each employee’s personal responsibility for protecting valuable information needs to be 
emphasized. 
Fourth, companies need to customize their IS security instructions and interventions to adapt to the 
cultural and local needs. This is especially relevant for global companies in which IS security 
management and policies may be centralized. Although high-level IS security strategies and policies 
are centralized and universal within a global company, lower-level IS security instructions should be 
customized. In addition, international standards (e.g., ISO/IEC 27001) and respective auditors should 
take into account the cultural differences pointed out in our study.  
Since the interviews revealed that employees in different countries prefer to use different means for 
learning IS security behaviors, future research should take into account the possibility that different 
learning methods work differently in different countries. In addition, future research should further 
examine which learning paradigms—behaviorism, cognitivism, constructivism, or social 
constructivism—are most effective across different cultures. In addition, future research should 
further investigate what cultural characteristics lead to the different behaviors. Qualitative and 
quantitative research approaches could be used to study this issue.  
Second, since the negative implication of sanctions was highlighted by Swiss and Finnish employees, 
future research should study the negative implications of sanctions. For example, future research 
could design an experiment in which the effects of different sanctions on employees’ attitude and trust 
towards their employer and IS security behavior are examined.  
5.2 Limitations of the Study 
The findings of this study are subject to the typical limitations of qualitative interview studies (see 
Lee & Baskerville 2003; Seddon & Scheepers 2012). Although the number of interviews is low from 
the perspective of statistical surveys, the key issue in interview studies is the point of saturation—not 
a high sample size or a certain predefined number of interviews (Seale 1999). In this study, the 
interviews were stopped when saturation was achieved. The literature suggests that the saturation 
point is different for different contexts; therefore, the number of interviews cannot be predefined. For 
example, Sarker et al. (2006) interviewed eight people, while Holmström Olsson et al. (2008) 
interviewed 22, and Sarker and Sarker (2009) conducted 25 interviews. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
Employees’ lack of adherence to IS security policies is a key problem for organizations. Previous 
studies have proposed different means aimed at explaining employees’ compliance, such as the use of 
sanctions and monitoring (deterrence theory), and fear appeal and training, which represent different 
paradigms of learning (behaviorism, cognitivism, constructivism, and social constructivism). While 
these studies have increased our understanding of employees’ IS security behavior, they do not test 
the validity of their models or methods across different cultural settings. Reflection on cultural studies 
suggests that cultural settings may influence the learning preferences and, hence, determine which 
means—behaviorism, cognitivism, constructivism, and social constructionism—are effective in 
different countries. Previous research on IS security behavior has not addressed this issue. Based on 
interviews in Finland, Switzerland, the UAE, and China, we argue that that while information security 
behaviors are learned, different paradigms of learning are effective in different cultures. Our results 
suggest that behavioristic methods are preferred in China, while constructivist methods are preferred 
in Switzerland. What is even more important is that providing non-preferred IS security interventions 
(e.g., monitoring or sanctions in Switzerland) seems to be negative in terms of improving information 
security. 
These papers have implications for IS security research, editors and reviewers, and practitioners. For 
research, this study suggests the need to test the effect of different IS security interventions in terms of 
different learning paradigms in different countries.  The implication for journal editors and reviewers 
is that they need to re-consider their reviewing policy; namely, they should accept papers that also 
show the limits of their model (not positive results) in some countries, in addition to positive results in 
different countries. Indeed, our results suggest that different cultures require different IS security 
interventions, and that decentralized IS security procedures should be customized to each country.   
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